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Abstract: In this paper, we estimate the impact of introducing a bonus-malus system 
on the probability of having automobile accidents, taking into account contract 
duration or the client mobility between insurers. We show that the new incentive 
scheme reduces accident rates of all policyholders when contract duration is taken 
into account, but does not affect accident rates of movers that shirk the imposed 
incentive effects of the new insurance pricing scheme. 
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Résumé: Dans cet article, nous estimons l’impact d’introduire une tarification bonus-
malus sur la distribution des accidents automobiles, en tenant compte de la durée 
des contrats d’assurance et de la mobilité des clients entre les assureurs. Nous 
montrons que la nouvelle tarification incitative réduit les taux d’accidents de tous les 
clients lorsque les durées de contrats sont prises en compte explicitement, mais n’a 
pas d’effet sur les taux d’accidents des mauvais clients mobiles qui contournent les 
effets incitatifs imposés par la nouvelle tarification. 
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1 Introduction
In 1992, the Tunisian government put in place a bonus-malus scheme for au-
tomobile insurance rating in order to increase road safety. The bonus-malus
scheme links insurance premiums to past reported accidents at fault. Usually,
such a system can have two e¤ects when the insurance industry is commit-
ted to its application (Dionne and Vanasse (1990); Abbring, Chiappori, and
Pinquet (2003); Dionne, Pinquet, Maurice, and Vanasse (2007)):
1. It can motivate drivers to be more prudent because past claims are
associated with an increased insurance premium in the future (moral
hazard); (Shavell (1979)).
2. It can improve risk-classication by allowing insurance companies to
make bad risk pay more and good risk pay less (risk classication);
(Crocker and Snow (1986)).
In this article, we are more concerned with the incentive e¤ect of the
bonus-malus. The main objective is to evaluate whether the Tunisian reform
was successful in decreasing the number of automobile accidents. There
are reasons to believe that the reform was not entirely successful. This is
because the reform has a aw. The bonus-malus system implemented by the
Tunisian government ranks drivers on a scale from 1 to 17 according to the
number of accidents they had, 17 being the worst score. However, the new
law indicates that if an individual changes insurance company, he must have
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a written proof of his previous score if he wants to keep it. Without such
a proof, he is awarded score 14. This gives an incentive to bad risks or to
individuals with score 15 or higher to switch insurance company in order to
bring back their bonus-malus score to 14. Thus the reform might encourage
mobility between insurance companies or reduce insurance contract duration.
If this e¤ect is important, it is then likely that the reform will be less e¤ective
on road safety than expected.
Dionne and Ghali (2005) show that the reform has no e¤ect on accidents
but they have not taken into account contract duration. They take into
account any potential selectivity bias by estimating selection equations. They
show that the reform had a positive e¤ect on the Exit decision and no e¤ect
on the Entry decision. For technical reasons, they did not estimate jointly the
three decisions (Accident, Entry, and Exit) and limited their simultaneous
analysis to reported accidents and exit decisions. They choose to model
the exit decision because the reform seems to have had no e¤ect on entry
decisions (Verbeek and Nijman (1992); Dionne, Gagné, and Vanasse (1998)).
However, their model of exit decisions does not take into account the fact
that the data on contract duration is right-censored. Moreover, times and
states before the contract period is not taken into account (left-censoring).
This methodology choice may have e¤ects on the estimation results.
In this paper, we estimate the joint distribution of accident rates and
contract duration. Analyzing contract duration instead of entry and exit
decisions simplies the estimation of the model (two equations instead of
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three) and permits to take explicitly into account censoring. Moreover, our
model allows us to explicitly test whether individuals whose propensity to
have accidents is higher also have higher mobility. This is done by exploiting
the longitudinal structure of the data.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and Section
3 describes the statistical model by focussing on contract duration. The
empirical results are presented in Section 4 and a short conclusion follows.
2 Data
To evaluate the impact of the reform, we have at our disposal a random
sample from the portfolio of a private insurer covering ve years from 1990 to
1994. This data come from Dionne and Ghali (2005). This private insurer has
a 7% market share in the Tunisian domestic insurance market. The sample
comprises 46; 337 observations on 25; 366 individuals. Hence, individuals are
observed over 2:7 records on average but almost two thousand individuals
are observed for the whole ve years.
We note that those who stay had on average less accidents than people
observed less than ve years (6:3% versus 7:3%). The variables available
in the data set are the exact same ones available to the insurer : sex of
the insuree, type of automobile, geographic location, and type of insurance
coverage. We know the exact date of all accidents. We also know the exact
dates for entries and exits if an individual purchased an insurance contract
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after 1990 or exited its contract before 1994. For people present in 1990, we
do not know if they were with the same insurer previously, a situation known
as left-censoring. Similarly, for people with a contract in 1994, we do not
know whether they will continue their insurance contract with the insurer, a
situation known as right-censoring.
(Table 1 here)
Table 1 describes the variables of the study while Table 2 presents their
summary statistics over the ve years. From Table 2, we observe that more
than 80% of insureds are male. The horsepower of the car does not represent
any unusual property nor the country origin of the car where more than 60%
come from France and 28% from Germany. The insurance coverage variables
need to be discussed. We observe that more than 80% of drivers buy the re
and the theft protections while only 2% hold the damage coverage. We must
emphasize that liability insurance is compulsory for all automobile owners.
It seems that damage insurance is very expensive and not felt as necessary
by the insureds. The bonus-malus scheme is based on reported accidents at
fault and information from other accident types does not a¤ect the insurance
premiums.
(Table 2 here)
Table 3 describes the accident distribution over the ve years of the study.
The new bonus-malus scheme was introduced on January 1, 1992. Before that
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date, the insurance premium was not a function of past accidents. The rst
changes in premium based on past experience occurred after January 1, 1993,
when the contracts come up for renewal. So we consider that the incentive
scheme becomes e¤ective by January 1, 1992 since the rational insureds start
anticipating its e¤ects on the premiums at this date.
With the new bonus-malus scheme, the third-party insurance premium is
adjusted by a multiplicative factor increasing or decreasing according to the
past experience. The premium is decreased by 5% if the policy holder has re-
ported no accident at fault during the last year. The policyholders premium
is raised by 10% for one reported accident, 30% for two reported accidents,
and 100% for more accidents reported (see Dionne and Ghali (2005), for more
details). So we must observe, after 1992, more incentive for road safety with
the new pricing scheme.
Indeed, the data in Table 3 seems to support a decrease in accident rates
over time, more particularly after 1991. Since only at fault accidents involv-
ing another party are included, the under reporting of accidents should be
not important because the other party has advantage to obtain compensa-
tion. But the bad risks (those with a bonus-malus score higher than 14) may
have an incentive to change insurer or reduce their contract length in order
to maintain their premium as low as possible. Unfortunately, we do not have
information on bonus-malus scores.
(Table 3 here)
6
3 Statistical model
In order to evaluate the impact of the Tunisian reform, we estimate a simul-
taneous model of contract length and accidents. It is necessary to take into
account insurees mobility because is it possible that the reform had an e¤ect
on both at fault claims and entries and exits. Indeed, as already discussed,
the number of reported accidents at fault seems to decrease over time. More-
over, the average presence of a policyholder over the 5-year period is 2.73
years: 43 percent of policyholders entered the insurer portfolio over the 5-
year period while 40 percent choose to exit. These exits and entries are more
accentuated after 1992. For example, in 1991, 32 percent of subjects were
new clients while 37 percent left at the end of the contract year. In 1993, the
corresponding numbers were 49 percent and 43 percent, respectively.
We use a Poisson distribution with random e¤ects to model the number
of reported accidents at fault by the insured person and an exponential dis-
tribution for the length of the relationship between the insured person and
the insurer. We refer to the duration of the relationship as contract duration
even though the decision to continue the contract is theoretically made on a
yearly basis. We discuss the specics of each equation next.
3.1 Accidents
The Poisson model applies to processes for which the outcomes are counts.
Our dependent variable is the cumulative number of accidents per period.
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Typically, a contract between an insurer and an insuree lasts a year but
many contracts have duration less than one year for unexplained reasons.1
It is necessary to use a count model instead of a dichotomous variable model
because the reform is anticipated to have a bigger impact on bad risks, i.e.
people more likely to have more than one accident. Let this number of
accidents for person i at period p be yip, then the conditional probability
distribution is written as
Pr(Yip = yipjxip) =
e ipyipip
yip!
; i = 1; :::; N ; p = 1; :::; 5 (1)
with the parameterization
ip = exp(
0xip) (2)
where xip is a vector of explanatory variables for period p (Hausman, Hall,
and Griliches (1984); Gouriéroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984)). In the
model with unobserved heterogeneity, we let ip depends on an individual
specic e¤ect i that does not vary over time as follows
ip = exp(
0xip + i) (3)
where i is assumed to be a normally distributed random e¤ect with variance
 orthogonal to covariates xip. We can identify  because of multiple
1We use the correct reparametrization of  to take into account such contracts.
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observations on the number of accidents for the same individual.
3.2 Contract duration
Some insurance contract spells were in progress when the observation period
began and we do not know their starting dates, a situation we refer to as left-
censoring. It is common practice to drop those observations as it is perceived
that they do not contain much information that can be exploited in empirical
studies. Given that the proportion of left-censored spells is relatively large
in our sample and our observation period is short, this solution is not very
attractive in our case. Moreover, given the sampling process, it is clear
that spells with longer than average full lengths are more likely to be in
progress at the survey date, a phenomenon known as length-biased sampling
(DAddio and Rosholm (2002)). Note that the incorporation of those spells
in the analysis is typically a very complex issue because of the fact that the
entry rate into the initial state is unknown. However, in the special case of
exponentially distributed duration, the density of left-censored corresponds
to the density of non-censored spells. We therefore maintain this assumption
for the rest of the paper.
More specically, we assume contract duration t has density
f(ti) = ipe
 ipti (4)
We note that ti refers to the whole duration of the relationship between the
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insurer and the insuree. The corresponding survivor function is
S(ti) = e
 itti (5)
and the hazard rate takes the simple form
h(ti) = ip (6)
In our application, the hazard rate is the conditional probability of moving
given the past length of the contract. We model parameter ip as
ip = exp(yip + 
0xip) (7)
where yip is the dependent variable in the accident equation (the number of
reported accidents at fault for individual i in period p.)
3.3 Estimation
Simultaneity between the two equations is introduced through a load factor
 on i and with the number of accidents from the Poisson regression ap-
pearing as a time-varying explanatory variables through  on the probability
of contract termination :
ip = exp(yip + 
0xip + i) (8)
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Note that we can test whether contract duration is exogenous in the ac-
cident equation by testing that the load factor  equals zero. Moreover,
the coe¢ cient estimates for  indicates whether individuals who are more
accident-prone (for unobserved reasons: i > 0) are more likely to switch
insurer (if  > 0) or more likely to stay with their current insurer (if  < 0).
Given the nested structure of the problem, we can derive the likelihood
function at the individual level and, assuming independence, take the product
to get the sample likelihood. The full joint marginal likelihood for the ith
person is given by:
Li =
Z

PiY
p=1
e ipyipip
yip!
h(ti)
DiS(ti)d (9)
where Di = 1 if we observe the complete contract duration and 0 otherwise
and Pi equals the number of periods insured i is observed. The full likelihood
function is then simply the product over all individuals. Estimation is done
by maximizing the marginal likelihood and integrating out the heterogeneity
components i:
L =
NY
i=1
Li
Since a closed form solution to the integral does not exist, we use Gauss-
Hermite Quadrature to approximate the normal integral.
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4 Results
The main results are presented in Tables 4 and 5 for parameter estimates
on both accidents model and contract duration. Table 4 is divided into four
columns. Each column presents parameter estimates from the estimation of
equation (1) with the parametrization in equation (2). When we limit the
number of observations to those who stayed in the portfolio of the insurer
over the 5-year period (Stayers), it is interesting to observe that the reform
(introduction of the bonus-malus scheme in 1992) has a negative and sig-
nicant e¤ect on the number of reported accidents at fault. This suggests
that the new pricing scheme has an incentive e¤ect on accidents for these
clients. When we consider all the 46,337 observations (all; with left and right
censoring), the reform e¤ect is no more signicant. The result is about the
same with the estimation of the Poisson distribution with no left censoring
(NLC spells, 25,229 observations) and with movers (35,542 observations).
So the desired reform e¤ect may have been eliminated by policyholders who
switch companies in order to skirt the improved incentive e¤ects of the new
insurance policy.
In order to test that interpretation, we present, in Table 5, the results
of two models where reported at fault accidents distribution and contract
duration are estimated simultaneously. We observe that the reform has now
a negative and signicant e¤ect on all clients and still no e¤ect on movers.
The main di¤erence between the results in the two tables resides in the
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introduction of the duration equations. It is interesting to observe that the
 parameter is statistically signicant in the specication of the duration
equations which indicates that the contract duration decision is endogenous.
Since the estimated  is positive, we conclude that more risky individuals also
have higher mobility. We also observe that the  parameter is lower for the
subcategory of movers. One interpretation is that there is more unobservable
heterogeneity in the overall population of clients than in the population of
movers (this can be seen from comparing the estimates for  from Table 4).
But it is also expected that since movers are more accident prone, variation
in i in this subgroup will have a lower impact on mobility decisions.
The control variables do not show surprising results. Male drivers are
more risky and more mobile than female drivers; owners of cars with more
horse power (8HP) are more risky and more mobile; those who buy damage
insurance are also more risky and more mobile while those who buy theft
coverage are more risky but less mobile.
(Table 4 here)
5 Conclusion
The object of this paper was to analyze how the introduction of a bonus-
malus scheme in automobile insurance pricing a¤ects incentives for road
safety. Under moral hazard and full commitment of the insurance indus-
try, pricing insurance on past accidents experience should reduce accidents.
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The bonus-malus studied has a aw in the sense that bad risks (movers)
escape higher premiums simply by changing insurer. Indeed we obtain that
this bonus-malus scheme has no e¤ect on accidents for movers although it
reduces the number of accidents for all clients in the portfolio. We should
emphasize that movers represent more than 75% of the insurer portfolio.
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Table 1: Variable description
Variable Description
Male Dummy variable : 1 if individual is male (reference group)
Female Dummy variable : 1 if individual is female
4 HP Dummy variable : 1 if vehicule has 4 horspower (reference group)
5 HP Dummy variable : 1 if vehicule has 5 horsepower
6 HP Dummy variable : 1 if vehicule has 6 horsepower
7 HP Dummy variable : 1 if vehicule has 7 horsepower
8 HP Dummy variable : 1 if vehicule has 8 horsepower
9 HP Dummy variable : 1 if vehicule has 9 horsepower
10+ HP Dummy variable : 1 if vehicule has 10 or more horsepower
Fire Dummy varibale : 1 if contract includes protection against re
Damage Dummy variable : 1 if contract includes protection against damage
Theft Dummy variable : 1 if contracts includes protection agains theft
France Dummy variable : 1 if vehicules made is French (reference group)
Italy Dummy variable : 1 if vehicules made is Italian
Germany Dummy variable : 1 if vehicules made is German
England Dummy variable : 1 if vehicules made is English
Asia Dummy varibale : 1 if vehicules made is Asian
Eastern Europe Dummy variable : 1 if vehicules made if Eastern European
Other Dummy varibale : 1 if vehicules made is from an other country
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Table 2: Summary Statistics per Year
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total
Gender
Male 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.82
Female 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18
Horsepower
4 HP 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20
5 HP 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.29
6 HP 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13
7 HP 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
8 HP 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11
9 HP 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
10+ HP 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Coverage
Fire 0.89 0.91 0.82 0.87 0.90 0.88
Damage 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Theft 0.83 0.86 0.76 0.79 0.77 0.80
Origin
France 0.64 0.61 0.63 0.62 0.59 0.61
Italy 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Germany 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.28
England 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Asia 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Eastern Europe 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
N 7549 7482 9641 10218 11447 46337
Table 3: Number of Reported Accidents at Fault per Year
Number accidents 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
0 92.25 92.38 93.33 93.17 93.29
1 7.17 7.03 6.30 6.31 6.20
2 0.50 0.55 0.34 0.47 0.45
3 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05
4 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
>0 7.75 7.62 6.67 6.83 6.71
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates - Poisson Model
All Stayers Movers NLC Spells
Female -0.064 0.103 -0.111 ** -0.165 ***
(0.048) (0.099) (0.053) (0.064)
5 HP 0.046 0.044 0.037 -0.021
(0.057) (0.115) (0.061) (0.073)
6 HP 0.165 ** -0.113 0.207 *** 0.122
(0.069) (0.162) (0.072) (0.083)
7 HP 0.194 *** 0.260 * 0.170 ** 0.096
(0.064) (0.140) (0.070) (0.084)
8 HP 0.362 *** 0.107 0.411 *** 0.342 ***
(0.072) (0.182) (0.077) (0.092)
9 HP 0.198 ** 0.000 0.226 ** 0.154
(0.087) (0.206) (0.095) (0.118)
10+ HP 0.295 *** -0.069 0.347 *** 0.232 *
(0.096) (0.223) (0.107) (0.128)
Fire -0.014 0.262 -0.081 -0.091
(0.080) (0.264) (0.082) (0.091)
Damage 0.972 *** -0.290 1.025 *** 1.180 ***
(0.082) (0.413) (0.091) (0.106)
Theft 0.182 ** 0.282 0.171 ** 0.183 **
(0.079) (0.255) (0.076) (0.088)
Italy -0.028 -0.067 -0.026 -0.024
(0.077) (0.163) (0.081) (0.101)
Germany 0.047 0.189 * 0.026 0.008
(0.042) (0.101) (0.048) (0.057)
England 0.042 -0.121 0.080 0.040
(0.206) (0.363) (0.183) (0.223)
Asia 0.122 0.308 0.070 0.098
(0.131) (0.376) (0.151) (0.170)
Eastern Europe 0.242 0.489 0.187 0.150
(0.240) (0.351) (0.282) (0.353)
Other 0.117 0.197 0.406 **
(0.174) (0.186) (0.199)
18
Table 4: contd
All Stayers Movers NLC Spells
Trend -0.003 0.079 -0.024 -0.019
(0.024) (0.054) (0.026) (0.030)
Reform -0.106 -0.450 *** -0.027 0.002
(0.072) (0.150) (0.078) (0.101)
Constant -2.722 *** -3.177 *** -2.585 *** -2.601 ***
(0.090) (0.214) (0.100) (0.141)
 0.723 *** 0.738 *** 0.687 *** 0.710 ***
(0.037) (0.065) (0.043) (0.053)
Number of obs. 46337 10795 35542 25229
ln-L -12311.78 -2582.79 -9687.01 -6733.82
Includes controls for region of residence
Statistical signicance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates - Simultaneous Model
Simultaneous model with Exponential duration
All Movers
Poisson Hazard Poisson Hazard
Female -0.073 * -0.165 *** -0.113 ** -0.126 ***
(0.042) (0.032) (0.053) (0.026)
5 HP 0.046 0.067 ** 0.038 0.036
(0.050) (0.033) (0.063) (0.027)
6 HP 0.158 *** 0.191 *** 0.206 *** 0.134 ***
(0.061) (0.041) (0.075) (0.033)
7 HP 0.195 *** 0.177 *** 0.172 ** 0.113 ***
(0.056) (0.037) (0.071) (0.029)
8 HP 0.361 *** 0.166 *** 0.408 *** 0.141 ***
(0.062) (0.041) (0.080) (0.032)
9 HP 0.202 *** 0.210 *** 0.224 ** 0.106 ***
(0.076) (0.050) (0.094) (0.038)
10+ HP 0.286 *** 0.171 *** 0.345 *** 0.118 **
(0.083) (0.063) (0.103) (0.051)
Fire -0.060 -0.404 *** -0.095 -0.299 ***
(0.073) (0.039) (0.087) (0.028)
Damage 0.961 *** 0.532 *** 1.017 *** 0.282 ***
(0.063) (0.090) (0.083) (0.066)
Theft 0.183 ** -0.332 *** 0.170 ** -0.248 ***
(0.073) (0.037) (0.086) (0.028)
Italy -0.043 -0.030 -0.028 -0.036
(0.070) (0.045) (0.084) (0.036)
Germany 0.034 -0.236 *** 0.021 -0.156 ***
(0.037) (0.027) (0.048) (0.022)
England 0.026 -0.124 0.076 -0.046
(0.184) (0.120) (0.221) (0.104)
Asia 0.080 -0.008 0.067 -0.063
(0.115) (0.099) (0.135) (0.078)
Eastern Europe 0.228 -0.514 *** 0.181 -0.280 **
(0.201) (0.164) (0.281) (0.138)
Other 0.083 0.115 0.200 -0.015
(0.153) (0.130) (0.179) (0.095)
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Table 5: contd
Simultaneous model with Exponential duration
All Movers
Poisson Hazard Poisson Hazard
Trend 0.029 -0.015
(0.024) (0.027)
Reform -0.184 *** -0.052
(0.071) (0.082)
Constant -2.428 *** -4.132 *** -2.569 *** -3.849 ***
(0.077) (0.040) (0.102) (0.030)
 3.029 *** 0.132 ***
(0.303) (0.049)
 0.293 *** 0.690 ***
(0.028) (0.046)
Number of obs. 46337 35542
ln-L -122540.93 -114834.54
Includes controls for region of residence
Statistical signicance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.
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